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PROSPECTS FOR CHANGING AIRLINE
OWNERSHIP RULES
YU-CHUN CHANG*
GEORGE WILLIAMS**

I.

INTRODUCTION

T IS PERHAPS reasonable to wonder that if the United States

can achieve the goal of liberalizing air services with other
countries through 'Open Skies' policies, whether there is any
real likelihood that its airline ownership rules will be relaxed?
A key reason why foreign ownership rules remain in place is
that they protect national airlines. In doing so, they also limit
the strategies available to governments whose flag carriers are in
difficulties. This was the situation the Philippine government
found itself in 1998 when Philippine Airlines halted most of its
flights due to a financial crisis. The option to designate another
country's airline to fly in place of Philippine Airlines was not
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possible. Even if a foreign airline had taken the majority shareholding of Philippine Airlines, the problem would still have remained. The only way this would work is if the bilateral partners
had been willing to amend the nationality clauses in their Air
Services Agreements ("ASAs").
Nationality clauses often work against the interests of less developed countries, especially those faced with economic crises
(like those in Asia in 1997). In such countries, there are usually
very few individual investors or organizations with sufficient capital to invest in a relatively risky enterprise such as an airline.
One option for these countries is to sell their airlines to foreign
investors, a policy that has been pursued by Korea, Malaysia, and
China. However, as most countries restrict foreign shareholdings to less than 50% due to the nationality clauses contained in
ASAs, they are unable to get the large financial injections they
need.
Most countries have favored privatization of their national airlines, with the prospect of reducing financial dependency and
enhancing efficiency. Governments have often stated that they
find the financing of their airlines' expansion difficult. Most
also believe that their airlines will perform more efficiently and
will be able to adapt to change more quickly under private ownership. Without a change in the ownership and effective control
restrictions contained in bilateral ASAs, however, foreign investors will not be interested in purchasing majority shareholdings
in airlines.
Not all countries are in favor of allowing their national airlines to be owned by foreign interests. For states that are heavily
dependent on high value tourism and have established national
airlines, there is a danger that they would lose the ability to directly influence the pace at which their tourist sectors will
develop.
Professor Wassenbergh has commented "State-interest in aviation is based on State sovereignty over the national air space and
the total control of foreign access to the national market. That
sovereignty represents money and status."1 Some countries,
with strong economies and successful, well-established, national
airlines have been strong advocates of liberalization, while
others in less advantageous positions have been fearful of the
consequences. The pressures for change that deregulation has
I Henri Wassenbergh, Policy Statements on InternationalAir Transport, 15
SPACE LAW,

291, 291 (2000).

AIR

&

20021

AIRLINE OWNERSHIP RULES

unleashed have affected all carriers virtually irrespective of their
own governments' stance. Airlines have little choice but to seek
structural adjustments in order to survive in the new
millennium.
II.

THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE

Since January 1991, seven large U.S. airlines have declared
themselves bankrupt, four of them ceasing operations.2 These
bankruptcies have raised congressional concerns about the effects of industry consolidation on domestic and international
competition. In 1992, the United States General Accounting
Office ("GAO") undertook research to provide information on
the effect of restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. airlines
by analyzing the potential impact of relaxing them.'
In its report, the GAO stated that foreign investments played
an important role in the U.S. economy.4 Improving access to
the world's capital markets for U.S. airlines by relaxing the current restrictions on foreign investment and control could help
them fund the investments they needed to remain viable competitors.' However, the U.S. government, concerned that some
foreign airlines are still subsidized by their home governments,
expressed the view that a foreign carrier could potentially pass
on its subsidies to a U.S. airline partner.6 Moreover, relaxing
the restrictions would have implications for U.S. airline employees and the Federal Aviation Authority's safety engineers and
inspectors. 7 The concern of the Department of Defense
("DOD") for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet ("CRAF") program provides another powerful reason for not amending the tight ownership restrictions.'
In 1992, the United States succeeded in negotiating its first
'Open Skies' Agreement with the Netherlands. 9 It later established a series of 'Open-Skies' bilaterals in 1995, beginning with
2 Braniff, Eastern, Midway, and Pan American ceased operations; three more
major airlines, America West, Continental and Trans World, reorganized under
court protection.
3 See General Accounting Office, Airline Competition - Impact of Changing
Foreign Investments and Control Limits on U.S. Airlines, GAO/RCED-93-7 (Dec.
1992) [hereinafter GAO Report].
4 Id. at 12.
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id. at 4.
7 See id. at 4-5.
8 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 4.
9 Air Transport Agreement, Oct. 14, 1992, U.S.-Netherlands, 12 U.S.T. 837.
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Switzerland, followed by Sweden, Norway, and Luxembourg. °
As of November 8, 2001, it had established 'Open Skies' Agreements with fifty-six countries around the world. 1
With such a significant number of bilaterals, each of which
permits unlimited fifth freedom operations and third country
code-sharing, U.S. airlines have an advantage over other carriers. For example, the U.S. government has established 'Open
Skies' agreements with Singapore and Taiwan. 12 While third
and fourth freedom rights between Singapore and Taiwan are
still limited by the Taiwan-Singapore bilateral agreement, U.S.
carriers already have unlimited frequency between the two
countries, as a result of combining their unrestricted fifth freedom rights from Taiwan and Singapore respectively.13 Indeed,
U.S. carriers already have unlimited third and fourth freedom
rights between any two countries that have signed 'Open Skies'
agreements with the U.S., effectively giving them seventh freedom rights.' 4 Thus, providing the U.S. government is able to
establish a large enough number of 'Open Skies' bilateral agreements, there would appear to be little incentive for it to make its
foreign ownership rules less restrictive.
III.

THE EU PERSPECTIVE

While U.S. carriers have been able to strengthen their positions by merging with other domestic carriers, leading to huge
domestic networks, airlines in Europe, Asia, and Latin America
are unable to grow in this way. When British Airways was keen
to merge with KLM last year, the economic advisor, Dorothy
Robyn, said at the International Aviation Club in Washington
DC, "If KLM comes under the effective control of BA while Bermuda II still governs US-UK air services, KLM will immediately
lose the benefits of the US-Netherlands 'Open Skies'
agreement." 5
10 DOT, New/Expanded Bilateral Air Services Agreements, available at http://
ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/intav/agnts.htm (last visited July 18, 2002).
It Id.

Id.
13 Chang, Y-C., The Influence of Airline Ownership Rules on Aviation Policies
and Carrier Strategies (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cranfield University,
UK) (on file with author).
12

14

Id.

15 Ben McMillan, KLM Would Lose U.S. Open Skies Under BA Control, AIR TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE, July 20, 2000.
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Even though the ownership rules have been relaxed within
the single European market, most non-EU countries have yet to
accept the changes. Thus, while Deutsche BA in Germany, the
fully owned subsidiary of British Airways, has automatic traffic
rights on any intra-EU route, it cannot, as a British-owned airline, fly from its base in Munich to Warsaw while the GermanyPoland bilateral agreement contains a national ownership
requirement.
Of Europe's three largest countries, only Germany and
France have signed 'Open Skies' agreements with the United
States.1 6 As for the U.K., attempts to reach a more liberal version of Bermuda II continue.17 Where the European Commission is concerned, it awaits a mandate from the Council of
Ministers to negotiate EU route rights with third countries. 8 It
has consistently argued that the 'Open Skies' Agreements between the U.S. and individual Member States have resulted in a
fragmentation of the common aviation market and therefore infringe EU law.' 9
In September 1999, the idea of forming a 'Transatlantic Common Aviation Area' ("TCAA") with the U.S. was put forward by
the Association of European Airlines ("AEA") .2"As part of such
an arrangement, airline ownership rules and rights of establishment would be harmonized along the lines of the EU Third
Package.2 1 While the idea has strong support in Europe, from
both the airline industry and some governments, it seems that
the U.S. has no intention to join a TCAA given the size of its
domestic market and the outcomes of its 'Open Skies' policies.
Michael Whitaker, vice president for international and regulatory affairs at United Airlines, stated that "the AEA paper was a
22
wrong approach as it reflected European regulatory thinking.
16

DOT, supra note 10.

See Environment, Transport, and Regional Affairs Committee, Eighteenth
Report, Air Service Agreements between the United Kingdom and the United
States (2000), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/
cm 199900/cmenvtra/532/53202.htm.
18Rational Thinking, FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 5, 2002, at 3. See also Alexander Campbell, BA/American's TransatlanticVision Shattered by U.S. DOT, FuGHT INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 5, 2002, at 23.
19Trevor Soames, UK Air Transport in the Context of Europe, presented at the EU
Policy and Programme (June 1, 2000).
20 See Assoc. of European Airlines, Towards a TransatlanticCommon Aviation Area
(Sept. 1999), availableat www.aviationtoday.com/reports/aeapdcy statement.pdf.
21 Id.
22 Jens Flottau, U.S. Maintains Cautious Attitude Toward TCAA, 152 AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., May 2000, at 42.
17
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IV. THE ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC") is the most
important organization to liberalize Air Services in the region.
Eight options for establishing more competitive air services with
fair and equitable opportunity for all member economies were
identified at its Air Services Group ("ASG") meeting in Singapore in October 1995.23 The first option concerned air carrier
ownership and control.2 4 The ASG undertook a survey of APEC
economies' policies and practices on the issue in 1998 and
found that most countries required their national airlines to be
substantially owned and effectively controlled by their own nationals.2 5 It also noted that in June 1997, the ICAO Air Transport Panel had recommended the nationality clauses in ASAs be
replaced by a requirement that any designated airline should
have its principle place of business in the territory of the
designating State. 26 The ASG, therefore, recommended that
APEC economies give consideration to relaxing their ownership
and control requirements on a case-by-case basis when considering designations made by their bilateral partners. 27 It was suggested that the ICAO formulation could be used as a guide/
option.2 8 The 29recommendation was categorized as being of medium priority.
In addition, in order to gradually liberalize air services APECwide, the formation of a 'Plurilateral Club' among like-minded
economies was proposed." It was put forward that any three or
more like-minded APEC member economies could initiate cooperative arrangements between and amongst themselves, so as
to accelerate the liberalization of air services within the region."
The most important suggestion was that if countries felt they
23 APEC Air Services Group on More Competitive Air Services With Fair and
Equitable Opportunity: Comprehensive Report on the Options (Feb. 26, 1998),
available at http://www.iot.gov.tw/scripts/tornado-apec/marker.exe?s=38p=October 1995 &; 420.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.

APEC, supra note 23.
Id.
30 APEC, Air Services Think Piece: Liberalization Concept (Mar. 27, 2000),
available at http://www.iot.gov.tvv/apectptwg/TPT/tpt-main/Steering-Committees/Competitive/tpt-wg-17-final-papers/Thinkpiece-Liberalization-Concepts.
doc.
31 Id.
28

29
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were not yet ready to join the club, they would be able to at a
later date. 2
In November 2000, a multilateral 'Open Skies' agreement was
reached between the U.S., Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore at a meeting of the APEC group in Brunei. 33 The key
differentiating feature of this multilateral agreement involves
the traditional airline ownership requirement being substantially liberalized, thus enhancing foreign carriers' access to
outside investment.3 4 It is the first time that the U.S. Government has signed such an agreement, and if it were to adopt this
approach with all its 'Open-Skies' partners, it would represent a
most effective way of bringing about change in airline ownership rules. 3 5 The relevant article concerning designation and
authorization states that: "(a) effective control of that airline is
vested in the designating Party, its nationals, or both; (b) the
airline is incorporated in and has its principal place of
business
36
in the territory of the Party designating the airlines.
Only nine days after signing the agreement however, the U.S.
Department of Transportation ("DOT") announced a ShowCause Order amending the airline foreign ownership rules contained therein. 7 The DOT plans to monitor the level of U.S.
ownership in the airlines from the other four participating
countries by requiring these carriers to notify the agency thirty
days in advance of any five percent change in their shareholdings." Although official translations of the agreement are proceeding, no signing date has been scheduled. 9 The
governments and airlines involved say that the proposal is unworkable because publicly traded companies cannot know a
month in advance about share sales by their stockholders.40 An
official with Singapore's Ministry of Communications and Infor32

Id.

33 DOT Press Release, United States, Asian Pacific Aviation Partners Enter Multicultural Open Skies Agreement (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http//
www.det.gov/affairs/2000/dot22200.htm (on file with the J. AIR L. & COM.)
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 DOT, Amending Authorities to Impose a Reporting Requirements (Nov. 24,
2000), available at http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.asp?qdocumentid=
116830&qdocketid=8393.
38 Zach Coleman, U.S. Plan Threatens 'Open Skies" Pact, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 2000, at 4.
39 Id.
40

Id.
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mation Technology said that the DOT's proposal "kind of
makes it difficult to go ahead and sign the agreement."4 1 Fortunately, after receiving the responses from related organizations,
the DOT decided to modify the order on 18 January 2001.42
V.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The EU was the first region in the world to remove the nationality clauses in Air Services Agreements. While cross-border
mergers and acquisitions increased following the Third Package, they have been nothing like the scale witnessed in the U.S.
since its domestic market was deregulated. The European market is not large enough to sustain so many 'national' airlines.
The formation of a common aviation market with the U.S. could
help to overcome this situation. However, there would appear
to be little incentive for the U.S. to change its ownership rules
and develop a TCAA with the EU. It would appear though that
the U.S. is keen to take the lead in APEC, obtaining benefits
from the Asia-Pacific market through its 'Open Skies' bilateral
agreements.
There is a well-established trend towards global alliances in
the airline industry, with mega-carriers waking up to the fact
that the aviation market in Asia-Pacific is both large and rapidly
expanding. Presently, foreign involvement in the region is relatively small, but it is growing. Equity investment in carriers
based in the APEC countries may help in the development of
strategic alliances. As IATA's director general, Pierre Jeanniot
said at the organization's last annual meeting held in Sydney:
"The answer to the challenge of globalization is to encourage
flexible and increasingly liberalized developments by likeminded groups of nations and airlines."4 It may, therefore, be
expedient for the EU to look to the Asia-Pacific region to find
an alternative way of establishing a Common Aviation Area and
in the process help European carriers expand their markets.
Id.
DOT, Amending Authorities to Impose a Reporting Requirement (Jan. 1,
2001), available at http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.asp?qdocumentid=
120846&qdocketid=8393.
43 Karen Walker, World Apart, AIRLINE Bus., July 2000, at 28.
41
42

